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Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
THE NEED TO EXPAND RELIEF
INTRODUCTION
The Immigration Nationality Act1 (INA) has a long
history of failing to provide special relief or, at a minimum,
special consideration for child immigrants.2 Criticism of the
immigration system reached new levels of concern in the last
year as the number of undocumented minors crossing the
southern border of the United States significantly increased.3
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) provides children
under the age of 21 with the opportunity to apply for status as
a Legal Permanent Resident4 (LPR).5 SIJS represents the first
and to date only “child-centered” immigration remedy
incorporating the traditional “best interest” standard applied in
proceedings related to children.6
1 The INA was the first consolidated immigration legislation enacted in
1952. Prior to the INA, immigration law was not organized into one cohesive code
section. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
2 David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in
Immigration Law, 38 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 393, 393 (2010).
3 Julia Preston, Rush to Deport Young Migrants Could Trample Asylum
Claims, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
20/us/rush-to-deport-young-migrants-could-trample-asylum-claims-.html?_r=0 (noting
that between October of 2013 and July of 2014, 57,000 undocumented minors have
crossed the border, marking a 92% increase from prior years); Kirk Semple, Youths
Facing Deportation to Be Given Legal Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2014), available at
http://www.nyti mes.com/2014/06/07/us/us- to- provide- lawyers- for - children- facing-
deportation.html ?emc=eta1.
4 Lawful Permanent Residence provides a path to citizenship and is
colloquially referred to as a “green card.” Green Card, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011).
5 Wendi J. Adelson, Case of the Eroding Special Immigrant Juvenile Statue,
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L & POL’Y 65, 76 (2008) (noting that SIJS relief is especially coveted
because it allows for instantaneous application for LPR status upon receipt of the SIJS
visa, whereas, many immigration relief options require a significant waiting period
between obtaining certification and adjusting to status as a LPR).
6 David B. Thronson, Kids will be Kids? Reconsidering Conception of
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 979, 1008 (2002)
[hereinafter Thronson, Kids]; David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here: Toward
a More Child-Centered Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 68 n.41 (2006)
[hereinafter Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here].
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Obtaining SIJS relief involves multiple stages of review
by both state officials and federal immigration officers. First, a
juvenile must secure a special findings order7 from a state
juvenile court. The order must state that: 1) the child is
dependent upon the juvenile court8 or “legally committed to, or
placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a state,
or an individual or entity appointed by a state or juvenile court”;
2) reunification of the child with one or both parents “is not
viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or similar basis
found under State law”; 3) return of the child to his or her home
country would not be in the child’s best interest; and 4) the child
is unmarried and under the age of 21 at the time of filing.9
Second, the special findings order is sent along with the
special immigrant petition (Form I-36010) to United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),11 which
determines whether to accept or reject the order and thus grant
SIJS status.12 Obtaining a special findings order is the most
important hurdle in the application process because USCIS
defers to the state court’s determination as to the four factual
findings necessary to merit SIJS relief.13
Third, once granted SJIS status, an applicant is
automatically eligible to adjust to LPR status (Form I-48514)
7 The orders issued by family courts with the findings necessary for a SIJS
application are generally referred to as “special findings orders.” N.Y. STATE, OFFICE
OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIVE 4 (Feb. 7, 2011), available at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/external/OCFS_2011/ADMs/11-OCFS-ADM-
01%20Special%20Immigrant%20Juvenile%20Status%20%28SIJS%29.pdf.
8 A juvenile court is “a court located in the United States having jurisdiction
under State law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of
juveniles.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2011).
9 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012); Randi
Mandelbaum & Elissa Steglich, Disparate Outcomes: The Quest for Uniform Treatment
of Immigrant Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 606, 606 (2012). The definition for “child” in
INA 101(b) requires the status of “unmarried.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1).
10 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB
NO. 1615-0020, I-360: PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
(Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-360.pdf.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); Eligibility Status for SIJS, Memorandum from
William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
Regional Dirs. & Dist. Dirs. 2 (May 27, 2004), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/Archives%201998-
2008/2004/sij_memo_052704.pdf; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/eligibility-sij-status/eligibility-
status-sij (last updated July 12, 2011).
12 Thronson, You Can’t Get Here From Here, supra note 6, at 1007-08.
13 See id. at 1006. The USCIS officer is mostly concerned that the findings
put forth in the state court special findings order fulfill the statutory requirements, but
she does not adjudicate the findings. Id.
14 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB
No. 1615-0023, FORM I-485: APPLICATION TO REGISTER PERMANENT RESIDENCE OR
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which, if granted, would make a child eligible for a work
permit, driver’s license, subsidized health insurance, and
financial aid for higher education.15 Applicants are advised to
apply concurrently for SJIS and LPR status.16 Generally after
five years in LPR status, SJIS beneficiaries qualify for
naturalization.17 A SIJS beneficiary is restricted from
sponsoring a parent for immigration status.18
This note explores the problems that undocumented
children who live in homes where there is domestic violence
face when they seek SIJS relief. The increasing popularity of
SIJS among immigration advocates gives the impression that
SIJS is a comprehensive form of child-specific immigration
relief. However, in actuality, SIJS was meant to protect only
the most vulnerable undocumented children and to this day is
an inadequate statutory and regulatory scheme to recognize
which youth are the most vulnerable.
The following true stories illustrate the tension that
results from the lack of clear regulatory guidance to ensure
that children who live in homes where there is domestic
violence have a path to SIJS relief.
Jane19 has three brothers and three sisters, who all
recently moved from Albania to the United States with their
parents. Each member of Jane’s family is undocumented. Her
father planned for the whole family to gain status as derivatives
on his individual asylum application, but his application was
denied. Jane’s father has physically and emotionally abused
each of the children, as well as Jane’s mother, for the last 15
years. Jane’s mother had no recourse or option for escape in
Albania and unsuccessfully sought immigration protection in the
United States as a result of the abuse. Jane was hopeful that she
and her siblings might qualify for some type of relief. The family
was in and out of criminal and civil family courts to enforce
multiple orders of protection against the father. During a civil
ADJUST STATUS (June 20, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/files/form/i-485.pdf.
15 Kristen Jackson, Special Status Seekers, 34 L.A. LAWYER 20, 23 (2012);
Meghan Johnson & Yasmin Yavar, Uneven Access to Special Immigration Juvenile
Status: How the Nebraska Supreme Court Became an Immigration Gatekeeper, 33
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 63, 72 (2013).
16 Maura M. Ooi, Note, Unaccompanied Should Not Mean Unprotected: The
Inadequacies of Relief For Unaccompanied Immigrant Minors, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
883, 890 (2011).
17 Memorandum from William R. Yates, to Regional Dirs. and Dist. Dirs.,
supra note 11, at 2.
18 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(II) (2012); Thronson, Kids, supra note 6, at 1008.
19 Jane is a fictional name assigned to the actual child in this litigation.
1090 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
family court proceeding, Jane followed a legal advocate’s
suggestion and made a motion for special findings from the family
court that, if granted, would enable her to apply for SIJS.20
Susy was born in Honduras, where she lived alone with
her mother. Susy never lived with her father and grew up with
the knowledge that he was a violent alcoholic who had abused
his wife. When Susy was 10, her mother left for the United States.
Susy and her younger brother Jason were left in the care of their
Aunt Estella. Estella physically, emotionally, and verbally
abused Susy and Jason until twelve-year-old Susy arranged for
“coyotes” to smuggle Jason and her to the United States.
Upon arrival at the United States and Mexico border,
their group encountered border patrol authorities and
immediately ran back into Mexico. Susy and Jason were both
apprehended21 and spent 80 days at a detention group home
until their Uncle Francisco picked them up and took them to
live with him in New York.22
Susy explained to a state juvenile court in a
guardianship proceeding initiated by her Uncle that:
At first it was hard adjusting to a new place and a new language but
I now feel a lot more comfortable in the United States and I have
friends. It is the first time I feel safe and taken care of as a child—it
is a wonderful feeling to be provided for and be part of a loving
family . . . . I see my mother who lives close by with her boyfriend and
their baby daughter but my caretaker and head of family is
Francisco. I am happy living with him and his family.
Susy also petitioned for special findings with hope she
would benefit from SIJS relief.23
In the fall of 2013, Susy received the state juvenile
special findings order necessary to apply for SIJS, while Jane’s
only option was to appeal her denial of the same findings.24
20 Facts adapted from a Family Court Decision by Honorable Ilana Gruebel
[hereinafter Family Court Decision], rev’d, No. O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564 (N.Y.
App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015) (July 29, 2013) (on file with author).
21 Susy escaped, but when she realized that Jason was apprehended, she
traveled back to the border to ensure that Jason would not be alone.
22 Matter of MarcelinaM.-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 714-17 (App. Div. 2013).
23 Id. The procedural posture of the case is much more complicated than the
summary of facts indicates. Susy’s mother eventually petitioned for custody of Susy in
competition with the uncle’s guardianship proceeding. Ultimately, the Appellate
Division affirmed Susy’s mother’s competing custody petition for Susy and granted
Susy SIJS relief. Id. at 721.
24 Id. at 725; Family Court Decision, supra note 20. In fact, Jane’s appeal
resulted in a reversal of the Family Court’s order. See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015
WL 1447564 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015). The Second Appellate Department found
that the order of protection issued on her behalf against her father established the
necessary dependency required by SIJS. Id. at *2.
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This note focuses on the need to expand relief to children like
Jane. Specifically, that in order to provide explicit SIJS
eligibility for undocumented children who live in homes where
there is domestic violence, USCIS should issue a new federal
regulation or an official legal memorandum to explicitly include
a child who a juvenile court has intervened to protect from
domestic violence in the home as dependent upon a juvenile
court so that they qualify for a special findings order.25 Part I
explains that SIJS was initially intended as an immigration
relief only for children in long-term state foster care, a story
often untold amidst SIJS advocates today. Part II focuses on two
2008 SIJS amendments that clearly indicate Congress intended
to expand the pool of children eligible for SIJS relief. Part II also
illustrates the imperfect nature of the expansion and how
children in homes where there is domestic violence are likely to
be prejudiced by the modern SIJS statute. Part III then argues
that USCIS should promulgate a rule offering specific guidance
to state courts that would help ensure a clear path to SIJS relief
for children who live in homes where there is domestic violence.
I. UNDERSTANDING SIJS
SIJS was introduced to protect undocumented, minor
immigrants eligible for long-term foster care in 1990.26 It has been
substantively amended twice, first in 1997 (1997 Amendments)27
and most recently in 2008 (2008 Amendments).28 The type of child
seeking SIJS relief drastically changed after the 2008
Amendments.29 Advocates enthusiastically embraced SIJS,
hoping it was a step toward more comprehensive, child-specific
25 See infra Part I.A.
26 Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a
Juvenile Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to
Marriage Fraud Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42847 (Aug.
12, 1993). Prior to the enactment of SIJS, immigration relief had been offered to
children for a limited period of time under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, however, those benefits were only extended for a particular group of children who
had been in the United States prior to 1982. Id.
27 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460 (1997).
28 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, & 22 U.S.C.).
29 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir: Domestic Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Field
Operations (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/
Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf; see infra Part II for more discussion
about this change.
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immigration relief.30 Regrettably, state case law indicates there
remains significant confusion as to who is eligible for the state
special findings order that is essential for SIJS relief.31
In many ways, SIJS was initially envisioned as a narrow
solution to a pre-existing state child welfare crisis.32 Several
advocates in the state of California noticed that vulnerable
children in the foster care system had a particularly difficult
path to citizenship.33 With the encouragement of a local
Congressman, Ken Borelli, the then-Deputy Director for Child
Welfare in Santa Clara County, California, drafted the
beginnings of SIJS legislation.34 As the bill was passing through
Congress, it gained support from child-welfare workers across
the state of California who realized that a large number of
children who aged out of the state foster care system lacked
immigration status.35 As a result, these children found it difficult
to live balanced and stable lives.36 The product of the California
based efforts was SIJS, a relief the advocates intended
exclusively to stabilize foster care children.37 SIJS provided
foster care children with the opportunity for a green card and,
as a result, federal benefits and legitimate employment.38 SIJS
relief led to an improvement on the quality of life for foster care
children because “[e]ligibility for federal benefits correlates
directly with improved socioeconomic status and health.”39 To
be sure, SIJS also benefited the state of California because
federal benefits “decrease[ ] reliance on wholly state-funded
services provided to undocumented immigrants.”40
30 Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The
Treatment of Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 252-53 (2010).
31 Theo S. Liebmann, Keeping Promises to Immigrant Youth, 29 PACE L. REV.
511, 512 (2009).
32 Email from Ken Borelli, Retired Deputy Dir. for Child Welfare in Santa
Clara County, Cal., to author (Oct. 25, 2013) (on file with author).
33 Email from Ken Borelli, Retired Deputy Dir. for Child Welfare in Santa
Clara County, Cal., to author (Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with author).
34 Id.
35 Id.; Email from Ken Borelli, to author, supra note 32.
36 Id. An undocumented immigrant’s inability to access legal employment or
health insurance, higher rates of poverty, and constant threat of deportation generally
contribute to instability. Theo Liebmann, Ethical Advocacy For Immigrant Survivors of
Family Crisis, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 650, 655 (2012).
37 Id.
38 Jennifer Baum et al., Most in Need But Least Served: Legal and Practical
Barriers to Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for Federally Detained Minors, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 621, 623 (2012).
39 Id.
40 Id.
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Under the original Act, eligibility depended upon
whether the child established that: 1) she was declared
dependent on a juvenile court; 2) she was eligible for long-term
foster care; and 3) it was contrary to her best interest to return
to her home country.41 A child in Jane’s or Susy’s position would
not have qualified because neither were eligible for foster care.
At the time SIJS was enacted, it was not controversial
and barely drew attention at floor debate.42 In fact, only 28
commentators weighed in to question the rather narrow
procedural issue of how SIJS beneficiaries would adjust to LPR
status.43 Unfortunately, the lackadaisical attitude toward SIJS
quickly changed seven years later.
In 1997, Congress drastically amended SIJS.44 Senator
Pete Domenici from Arizona45 alleged that undocumented, un-
detained immigrant children severely abused SIJS relief.46
Specifically, he complained, “this is a giant loophole . . . every
visiting student from overseas can have a petition filed in a state
court . . . declaring that they’re a ward and in need of foster
care, . . . [and] they’re granting them.”47 In an attempt to “define
41 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J) (2012); Immigration Act of 1990, 1990 Pub. L.
No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 § 153 (1990); Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting
Undocumented Immigrant Children From Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How To
Ameliorate The Impact of The 1997 Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J.
237, 241 (2006); Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 607.
42 Lloyd, supra note 41, at 241.The only recorded discussion at the acceptance
of the 1990 SIJS act consisted of 28 commentators who questioned the potential
difficulty involved for children granted SIJS visas adjusting to LPR status. Special
Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court; Revocation
of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage Fraud
Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843, 42848-49 (Aug. 12, 1993);
Adelson, supra note 5, at 76; see also Carl Hulse, Immigrant Surge Rooted in Law to
Curb Child Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/us/immigrant-surge-rooted-in-law-to-curb-child-
trafficking.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22
RI%3A18%22%7D&_r=0 (describing the 2008 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 as “enacted quietly” continuing the under-the-
radar approach to amendments related to SIJS).
43 Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a
Juvenile Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to
Marriage Fraud Arrangements; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. at 42848-49;
Adelson, supra note 5, at 76.
44 Only some of the amendments are discussed in this note, although there
were additional SIJS amendments which made it more difficult for children in federal
custody to pursue SIJS relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) (2012); Lloyd, supra
note 41, at 240; see Ooi, supra note 16, at 890 (noting that the consent requirement
presented a significant procedural hurdle to many perspective SIJS applicants who
previously had unhindered access to juvenile courts).
45 Lloyd, supra note 41, at 239.
46 Id.
47 Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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more restrictively the minors to whom SIJS status was
available,” the 1997 Amendments specified that, in addition to
being dependent upon a state juvenile court as eligible for long-
term foster care, those eligible for SIJS must also demonstrate
that their dependency upon the state was “due to abuse, neglect
or abandonment.”48 A Congressional Report at the time of the
1997 Amendments included a brief explanation as to the intent
of the addition of “due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment:”
The language has been modified in order to limit the beneficiaries of
this provision to those juveniles for whom it was created, namely
abandoned, neglected, or abused children, by requiring the Attorney
General to determine that neither the dependency order nor the
administrative or judicial determination of the alien’s best interest
was sought primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, rather than for the
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect.49
The number of SIJS applicants noticeably decreased after the
restrictive 1997 Amendments but then steadily rose for the next
11 years.50 With a remarkable change of attitude, in 2008,
Congress reversed course and drastically amended SIJS,
resulting in increased access to relief.
II. EXPANDING RELIEF: THEWILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING
VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT
The 2008 Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)51 significantly expanded SIJS
eligibility.52 The TVPRA passed easily with little debate or
attention, even though, since that time, advocates have
demanded federal regulations to clarify the 2008 Amendments.53
48 Lloyd, supra note 41, at 239.
49 105 CONG. REC. H26615 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (emphasis added).
50 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat.
2440, 2460 (1997); see infra Table 1. The chart indicates that SIJS beneficiaries
decreased by approximately 140 between 1997 and 1998.
51 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, & 22 U.S.C.).
52 Young & McKenna, supra note 30, at 252. Many provisions of the TVPRA,
even some related to SIJS, are beyond the scope of this note but have been widely
discussed elsewhere. For detailed review of all the changes to SIJS, see DEBORAH LEE
ET AL., UPDATE ON LEGAL RELIEF OPTIONS FOR UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN
FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS
PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008, at 3-4 (Feb. 19, 2009) (on file at AILA
InfoNet, Doc. No. 09021830).
53 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,978, 54979
(proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205, and 245); Hulse, supra
note 42 (“Advocates saw it as a breakthrough on sex trafficking after Congress had
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In fact, the 2008 Amendments were heralded as the “first major
steps toward developing a more effective system to address the
needs of unaccompanied children.”54 In particular, eligibility
was expanded so a child only needed to establish that
reunification was not viable with “one or both parents”55 rather
than both parents.56 Similarly, a child no longer needed to
establish that she was eligible “for long-term foster care.”57
Both of these 2008 Amendments broadened the scope of SIJS
eligibility beyond foster care children.
Despite the benefits of the 2008 Amendments, immigrant
children living in homes where domestic violence is prevalent
may face difficulties accessing SIJS relief. Children continue to
be arbitrarily precluded from special findings orders where the
family court petitioner is a child’s parent or where the child is
not in the “correct type” of family court dependency proceeding.
The 2008 Amendments and the difficulties of applying the new
language to juvenile court proceedings are explored in turn in
the remainder of this section.
A. “One or Both Parents”
The 2008 Amendments show that Congress intended to
“expand eligibility.”58 Prior to the 2008 Amendments, before a
state court could grant a special findings order, a child needed
to show that reunification with both parents was impossible,
which required establishing that both parents “effectively
already scuttled an earlier attempt at broad immigration reform despite the strong
backing of Mr. Bush. Just two House Republicans—Representative Jeff Flake of
Arizona and Representative Paul Broun of Georgia—opposed the measure when it first
passed the House in 2007, but it went through Congress without opposition and with
little notice in the post-election session of 2008. Aides to Mr. Flake, now a senator, said
he did not foresee the current problems but was more concerned about holding the line
on federal spending at the time.”). The relationship between the regulations
accompanying SIJS remain problematic today as regulations accepted in 2011 still
await codification.
54 Young & McKenna, supra note 30, at 252-53.
55 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Leadership, supra note 29.
56 Mandelbaum & Steglich supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Operations, supra note 29.
57 Mandelbaum & Steglich supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum from Donald
Neufeld, to Field Operations, supra note 29.
58 In its commentary to the proposed regulations, USCIS recognizes that the
“one or both parents” addition was intended to “expand eligibility” but fails to provide
any guidance in the actual regulations which would encourage uniform state
interpretation of the change. See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 54979; see also Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 608; Memorandum
from Donald Neufeld, to Field Leadership, supra note 29.
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relinquished control of the child.”59 The traditional dual parent
reunification requirement was closely linked to the necessity of
showing that a child was eligible for long-term foster care. Prior
to a child entering long-term foster care, courts must generally
find that “family reunification is no longer a viable option” with
either parent.60 The dual parent reunification was initially
intended to operate as an indication of the threshold
vulnerability Congress thought SIJS beneficiaries should
establish to merit the immigration benefit.61 The elimination of
dual parent reunification created opportunities for immigration
relief for mostly non-foster care children, thereby lowering the
vulnerability threshold necessary to qualify for SIJS.
The Second Appellate Department of the New York
Supreme Court and state appellate courts in California and
Minnesota recognize that through the 2008 Amendments,
Congress intended to expand eligibility and thus extend SIJS
eligibility to children who may have the option of reunification
with one parent.62 Despite the clear language of the amended
statute, some jurisdictions interpret “one or both parents” to
require a showing that reunification is not possible with either
parent.63 The Supreme Court of Nebraska determined in In re
Erick M. that “one or both parents” required an immigrant child,
who was abandoned by his father in Mexico but lived with his
mother, to establish that reunification was also not possible with
his mother prior to granting his SIJS special findings order.64 In
order to reach that result, the court first found that the
Amendment’s language was ambiguous and then
counterintuitively reasoned that while “the effect of the 2008
amendment was to expand the pool of children eligible for
SIJS . . . juveniles must still be seeking relief from parental abuse,
abandonment, or neglect” because the narrowness introduced by
59 In re Menjivar, Case No. A70117167, 29 Immig. Reptr. B2-37, at 170
(A.A.U. Tex., Dec. 27, 1994).
60 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 ANGIE JUNCKETAL., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILESTATUS 4-10 (3rd ed. 2010).
62 Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rpr. 3d 729, 736 (4th Dist. Cal. 2014);
In re Welfare of D.A.M, No. A12-0427, 2012 WL 6097225, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10,
2012); Marcelina M-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714, 723 (App. Div. 2013); see also In re
Miguel C.-N., 989 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App. Div. 2014); In re Jorge A.V.G., 987 N.Y.S.2d
909 (App. Div. 2014); Sanchez v. Bonilla, 982 N.Y.S. 2d 373 (App. Div. 2014); Cecilia
M.P.S. v. Santos H.B., 983 N.Y.S.2d 840 (App. Div. 2014); Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d
52, 54 (App. Div. 2014); P.E.A. v. A.G.G., 975 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (App. Div. 2013).
63 See infra note 65.
64 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639, 641, 648 (Neb. 2012). In that case, the immigrant
child lived with his mother, and there were no allegations of abuse in that relationship.
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the 1997 Amendments illustrated that the prevailing purpose of
the legislation as a whole was to restrict eligibility.65
Some courts follow the suspicious reasoning of Erick
M.66 For example, the New Jersey Superior Court recently
reconsidered its prior broad interpretation of the “one or both
parents” language in a decision denying a special findings
order.67 The court explained that although there is no specific
legislative history as to the meaning of “one or both parents,”
“some guidance can be gained from the legislative history of the
2008 legislation as a whole.”68 The court then reviewed the
history of the 2008 Amendments, concluding that only a narrow
interpretation was consistent with the legislation’s purpose:
[T]he legislative and administrative history of Subparagraph J
shows two competing goals. Congress wanted to permit use of the
SIJS procedure when necessary to prevent the return of juveniles to
unsafe parents. Where such protection is unnecessary, however,
Congress wanted to prevent misuse of the SIJS statute for
immigration advantage . . . . The contrary interpretation does not
achieve both of Congress’s goals. It would mean that a juvenile could
apply for SIJS status, with its immigration advantages, even if that
juvenile could be viably reunified with one parent who never abused,
neglected, or abandoned the juvenile. Indeed, it would permit SIJS
status even if that safe parent had raised the juvenile from birth, in
love, comfort, and security, and even if reunification with the safe
parent would not result in any further contact with the unsafe
parent. Nothing in the legislative history of Subparagraph J
supports such a broad interpretation. 69
Even under the former New Jersey precedent that
broadly interpreted the statutory language, the court was
hesitant to recognize a rule that a child in a stable home
environment with one parent might be eligible for SIJS:70
Under normal circumstances, the court would be reluctant to take
jurisdiction in a case where, as here, the children are in a safe
65 Meghan Johnson & Kele Stewart, Unequal Access to Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status: State Court Adjudication of One-Parent Cases, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION (July 14, 2014), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/childrights/content/articles/summer2014-0714-unequal-access-special-
immigrant-juvenile-status-state-court-adjudication-one-parent-cases.html.
66 See M.P.C. v. A.B.C., No. FD-13-20-10, 2012 WL 1205805 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 12, 2012) (affirming a denial of dependency for special immigrant
juvenile status because 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) did not allow SIJS for a child living
with a non-neglectful parent in the United States); see also D.C. v. A.B.C., 8 A.3d 260,
266 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010).
67 H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d 255, 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014).
68 Id. at 267.
69 Id. at 268.
70 In re Minor Children of J.E. and J.C., 74 A.3d 1013, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2013).
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placement with one of their natural parents. This case is different.
The children were placed with petitioner by immigration authorities
and that placement triggers the need for the court’s supervision of
that placement to make certain that the children are safe and well
taken care of. 71
The result of the confusion and conscious disregard for the
clear statutory language is that some children are arbitrarily
denied special findings orders even though Congress clearly
intended to expand SIJS’s scope.72
B. Dependency
The elimination of the “long-term foster care”
requirement explicitly broadened eligibility for SIJS relief
beyond the child welfare system. As a substitute, a child “placed
under the custody of . . . an individual or entity appointed by a
State or juvenile court” was to be deemed dependent.73 As the
statute currently reads, in order to pursue a SIJS special
findings order a child must establish that she is dependent upon
the juvenile court in one of three ways:74 1) she has been
committed to a state agency or department, 2) she is dependent75
upon the juvenile court because of a particular proceeding, or 3)
she has been committed to an individual entity by a state
juvenile court.76 The first option is a vestige of the initial intent
of SIJS to include foster care children. The second option pre-
existed the 2008 Amendments but only recognizes dependency
on a juvenile court because of a proceeding that relates to the
71 Id. The facts of the boys’ case were particularly compelling. Their mother
fled to the United States from Honduras and was granted temporary protected status
after the father of the children shot at her three times. The boys remained with the
father in Honduras for 10 years and were abused by their stepmother and father, who
was eventually killed as a result of his involvement in drug trafficking. The boys were
abandoned and fled to the United States out of fear that witnessing their father’s death
would jeopardize their safety. Once in the United States, they surrendered to
immigration authorities and were released as undocumented minors to their mother’s
care after two months in a juvenile detention facility. Id. at 1014-16. This decision was
the law of New Jersey prior to the decision this summer that changed the course of
New Jersey juvenile jurisprudence.
72 Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 88-89.
73 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2012).
74 The additional amendment allowing for guardianship proceedings
expanded eligibility to non-foster care children but did not go far enough because the
dependency prong still continues to hinder some eligible children.
75 I have italicized this first use of “dependency” to highlight the distinction
between this dependency which refers to “dependency on a juvenile court” from the
Dependency prong which encompasses each of the three options for establishing
dependency. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
76 Id.
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“care and custody” of the child.77 The third option was the 2008
substitution that recognized guardianship proceedings as
fulfilling the dependency requirement. The remainder of this
sub-section explores the two dependency options most utilized by
the post-2008 non-foster care SIJS beneficiaries: the
guardianship option and the dependency option.
1. Guardianship
In many ways, the addition of guardianship merely
drew attention to the pre-existing use of guardianship as bona
fide dependency under the SIJS statute.78 Prior to the 2008
Amendments, some state courts already granted special
findings orders based on guardianship proceedings,79 and the
1994 Administrative Appeals Office In re Menjivar decision
recognized guardianship as an authorized action establishing
court dependency for a SIJS special findings order.80 The
Appeals Office found:
[t]he acceptance of jurisdiction over the custody of a child by a
juvenile court, when the child’s parents have effectively relinquished
control of the child, makes the child dependent upon the juvenile
court, whether the child is placed by the court in foster care or, as
here, in a guardianship situation.81
After Menjivar, some state courts recognized that a
guardianship petition sufficiently established the necessary
dependency to grant a child a special findings order.82 Prior to
the TVPRA, the New York Supreme Court First Appellate
Division recognized that a finding in favor of guardianship
fulfilled the necessary dependency to grant a SIJS special
77 Federal regulations define a juvenile court as a court that handles
proceedings related to a child’s “care and custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2009).
78 See generally In re Menjivar, Case No. A70117167, 29 Immig. Rptr. B2-37
(A.A.U. Tex., Dec. 27, 1994).
79 Id.; In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d 576 (App. Div. 2008). Some may
argue that guardianship was not accepted as a grounds for dependency prior to 2008 in
New York. See In re Guardianship of Vanessa D., 15 Misc. 3d 819 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2007);
In re Zaim R., 13 Misc. 3d 180 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006). In each case the special findings
motions were dismissed on jurisdiction grounds because the petitioner aged out, but
included no discussion that the guardianship was an improper basis upon which to
grant special findings. In addition, New York later recognized guardianship
proceedings as sufficient to establish the necessary dependency to grant a special
findings order. In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
80 In reMenjivar, 29 Immig. Rptr. B2-37, at B2-39.
81 Id.
82 In re Alamgir A. 917 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 2011); Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan
W. 901 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2010); Liebmann, supra note 31, at 518 n.56.
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findings order.83 The explicit codification of the administrative
Menjivar rule was indicative of Congress’s intent to expand
relief beyond foster care children. For the first time, the SIJS
statute explicitly recognized an affirmative path to relief
whereby a child could petition a state court to commence
guardianship proceedings. This marked a significant change
from SIJS’s origins, which only allowed a child to seek a special
findings order after she had become completely dependent
upon the state as a ward.84 Specifically, states recognized that
the expansion was justified under the original intent of SIJS
because child welfare agencies were generally reluctant to file
cases against parents outside of the United States85 due to
difficulties gathering data and investigating.86 Thus, the
codification of guardianship as a dependency option made
sense as a means for a vulnerable child to affirmatively petition
the court when the state was hesitant to initiate protection
proceedings.87 The Amendment was not such a far stretch from
the original intent of the legislation, but in fact drastically
expanded access to a special findings order.88
2. Dependency on a Juvenile Court
While the guardianship expansion recognized and
affirmed the need for a broader awareness of how children might
come before the court, the dependency option was left untouched.
This dependency is not established by all juvenile court
proceedings, but only includes proceedings that are narrowly
considered to relate to the “care and custody” of the child.89
In spirit with the 2008 Amendments, which recognized
that potential SIJS beneficiaries might come before the court in
ways other than as a state ward, immigration advocates in
New York City attempted to litigate an expansion of the
83 In re Antowa McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
84 See supra Part I.
85 The problem was not likely jurisdictional since the New York Family Court
Act Section 1015 explicitly grants the family court jurisdiction over any case where a
child resides in the county where the court sits, regardless of where the maltreatment
may have occurred. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1015 (a) (McKinney 1998); Liebmann, supra
note 31, at 518 n 56.
86 Liebmann, supra note 31, at 518.
87 Id.
88 Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 64-65; see infra Table 1.
89 Federal regulations define a juvenile court as a court that handles
proceedings related to a child’s “care and custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2009).
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meaning of the narrow interpretation of dependency.90 New
York City advocates who argued that dependency should be
interpreted more broadly relied heavily upon a memo issued by
the Chief Administrative Judge of New York’s Unified Court
System, Judge Ann Pfau,91 noting:
Juveniles may be eligible to apply to federal immigration authorities
for SIJS where, in any category of court proceeding, a State court has
determined that they are abused, neglected or abandoned, that
“family reunification is not an option”[92] and that it would be
contrary to their best interests to return to their home country.93
Specifically, advocates argued that a child before the juvenile
court because of a child support order or a civil order of
protection should fulfill the “dependent on a juvenile court”
option and receive a special findings order.94
In In re Hei Ting C., the Second Department declined to
recognize dependency where a child found himself under the
jurisdiction of a family court to enforce a child support order.95
The court’s opinion specifically declined to expand dependency
because “no appellate decisions in this State have addressed
the question of whether an order issued by the Family Court
that does not award or affect the custody of a child satisfies the
dependency prong.”96 Similarly, in Jane’s case, the Kings
County Family Court declined to issue a special findings order
based upon the order of protection issued on behalf of a juvenile
against her father.97 Judge Gruebel’s order specifically noted
that because:
the children still live[d] with their mother, there has been no finding
of abuse or neglect against the father in an Article 10 proceeding,
and the court in this case has not accepted jurisdiction over the
90 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Family
Court Decision, supra note 20.
91 Interview with Lauren Burke, Clinical Professor at Brooklyn Law School
and counsel in In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150 (App. Div. 2013) (Nov. 29, 2013)
(notes on file with author).
92 This is the definition of “eligible for long-term foster care” in the federal
regulations, a broader definition than foster care under New York law. “Long-term
foster care” under the regulations means care until the child reaches the age of
majority and specifically includes adoption and guardianship. Memorandum from Hon.
Ann Pfau, Chief Admin. Judge of N.Y. Unified Court Sys., to Judges of the Family
Court 2 n.2 (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author) (citation omitted).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d at 151; Family Court Decision, supra note 20.
95 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
96 Id.
97 Family Court Decision, supra note 20.
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custody of the children . . . the requisites required [by] special
immigrant juvenile status are not met.98
Thus, family courts in one of the most immigrant
friendly states, New York,99 continued to require a juvenile
court action that is related to the “care and custody” of the
child,100 excluding support orders and only recently recognizing
certain orders of protection as a basis to request a SIJS special
findings order.101
The narrowness of the dependency option presents little
or no difficulty for foster care children seeking SIJS relief
because they have already been committed to a state agency
and therefore fulfill the dependency prong.102 In contrast, a
non-foster care child similar to Jane or Susy might not be
exposed to a state child welfare system and might have a
difficult time establishing dependency.103
[D]espite an ongoing obligation to protect and support vulnerable
children, especially those who have been harmed by abuse and
neglect, it cannot be assumed that a local child protection agency
will come to the aid [of children], calling into question one of the
underlying premises of the federal statute and regulations
establishing the SIJS criteria. At times . . . a youth simply does not
come to the attention of the child protection agency. At other times,
because a youth already has the support of an adult caregiver, often
a relative, the child protection agency will determine that the youth
is safe, no longer at risk of harm, and thus does not need the
agency’s assistance.104
98 Id. at 4.
99 See generally Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to
Wilberforce: Is the U.S. Government’s Approach to Child Migrants Improving?, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Feb. 2011, at tbl. 11 (ranking New York fourth among states granting SIJS
petitions); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE ANDDETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR
2013 tbl. 4 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-
lawful-permanent-residents (click “Table 4”); Ghita Schwarz, Why New York Is Still the
Capital of Immigrant America, THE NATION, (Jan. 6, 2015) http://www.thenation.com/
article/173957/why-new-york-still-capital-immigrant-america.
100 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a) (2014).
101 See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr.
1, 2015) (finding that “under the proper circumstances, a child involved in a family
offense proceeding involving allegations of abuse or neglect may properly be the subject
of such a determination as an intended beneficiary of the SIJS provisions”).
102 Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, former immigration
practitioner at The Door’s Legal Servs. Ctr. (Nov. 6, 2013); Email from David B.
Thronson, former immigration practitioner at The Door’s Legal Servs. Ctr., to author
(Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with author).
103 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 610.
104 Id.
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Susy was lucky enough to have a guardian who could petition on
her behalf, but Jane did not have that option and was left with
only the option to fulfill the more demanding dependency prong.105
The 2008 expansion of SIJS eligibility created a new
dynamic. SIJS had been a solution to a pre-existing state child
welfare matter, rather than an immigration remedy.106 As
explained by Wendy Young, president of Kids in Need of
Defense and an immigration adviser to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy at the time of the TVPRA’s passage, “[t]here was a
recognition that these kids are incredibly vulnerable . . . .”107
Children who were not in foster care and who had been
ineligible for SIJS prior to 2008 now had new immigration
opportunities. Immigration advocates recognized that they
could initiate proceedings in family court in order to pursue
SIJS special findings for non-foster care children.108
Prior to the TVPRA, most SIJS applicants initially came
“to the attention of state child welfare authorities rather than
federal immigration authorities.”109 A review of the current
number of foster care children compared to non-foster care
children that benefit from SIJS relief since 2008 illustrates
that foster care children are not the primary beneficiaries of
SIJS relief.110 In New York City, between January 2011 and May
2013, only 340 children under the custody of Administration for
Children Services (ACS)111 or in foster care were identified as
105 Arguably, Jane’s mother could have petitioned for guardianship on her
behalf and perhaps made Jane eligible for SIJS relief in that way. However, her
mother’s autonomy to pursue the civil remedies she believes most effective for her
family should be preserved. The civil order of protection was a less invasive form of
civil relief and Jane should not be punished because her mother sought help in that
way as opposed to seeking to terminate her father’s parental rights.
106 The history of the enactment of SIJS described infra note 33 and
accompanying text also clearly illustrate that the driving force behind SIJS was the
need to clean up a state welfare problem rather than an immigration problem.
107 Hulse, supra note 42. Wendy Young’s statement refers to more than SIJS
eligible children since the TVPRA provided increased protection for children in
immigration proceedings generally, even beyond those eligible for SIJS.
108 In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a prima facie
case of dependency for a child living with her aunt, even though the child did not
request services from the Department of Children Families or the State because the
child was dependent as a matter of law, in that she was not being cared for by a
guardian or parent).
109 Susan Schmidt & Jacqueline Bhabha, Kafka’s Kids: Children in U.S.
Immigration Proceedings Part II: Beyond and Besides Asylum, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb.
2007, at 35.
110 Only a regional data comparison is possible because of the poor data
collection and availability in this area at both the state and federal level.
111 Administration for Children Services is the New York City agency
providing protection for abused and neglected children. About ACS, NYC ADMIN. FOR
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eligible for SIJS.112 Of those eligible, 231 (67.9%) were referred to
legal services for further review of their eligibility.113 Only 99
children (29%) were granted SIJS status at the time of the
report in June 2013.114 Some of those referred for further review
pursued different immigration relief or were later determined to
already hold United States citizenship or LPR status.115 No
official data has been published as to the total number of SIJS
beneficiaries from the State of New York during that time
period, but for the two years prior to that time period (2009-
2010), a reported total of 370 petitions were granted.116 As a
rough estimate, comparing the number of SIJS beneficiaries
from New York State between 2009 and 2010 to the number of
New York State foster care children reported to have benefited
from SIJS relief, between January 2011 and March 2013,
approximately 27% of SIJS petitioners were foster-care
children.117 Despite the clear shift in intended beneficiaries,
many vulnerable non-foster care children continue to fall
through the cracks of SIJS relief.
3. Expanded SIJS Relief Does Not Include
Consideration of Domestic Violence
The spirit of the 2008 Amendments—to provide more
comprehensive relief to vulnerable children—falls short of its
goal because special findings orders are granted on arbitrary
grounds that are not indicative of a child’s vulnerability. The
problem lies in the decision by Congress to condition special
findings orders on the type of proceeding in which the child
approaches the state juvenile court. The problem is both one of
CHILD. SERVICES, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about/about.shtml (last visited
May 1, 2015).
112 N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., LOCAL LAW 6 OF 2010: ANNUAL
REPORT 7-9 (June 2013).
113 Id.
114 Several of those identified submitted SIJS petitions and awaited their
interview, or were preparing a SIJS petition. Others had legal status or pursued relief
more favorable to their particular case. Id.
115 Id.
116 Jacqueline Bhabha & Susan Schmidt, From Kafka to Wilberforce: Is the
U.S. Government’s Approach to Child Migrants Improving?, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Feb.
2001, app. 1, tbl 2.
117 This number is obviously flawed because it compares data for foster-care
beneficiaries from a different time period than total New York State beneficiaries. In
addition, it only includes New York City foster care children while the total number of
New York beneficiaries likely includes non-NYC foster care children who might have
received SIJS status. Given the lack of data in this area, this comparison, flawed as it
may be, is likely the most useful to illustrate the low percentage of foster care SIJS
beneficiaries compared to non-foster care beneficiaries.
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misinterpretation of federal legislation by state courts as seen
by the “one or both parents” interpretation, and poor legislative
and regulatory drafting at the federal level as seen with the
rigid narrowness of dependency. Children living in homes
plagued by domestic violence are particularly affected by the
arbitrary requirements that juvenile courts use to determine
whether to grant special findings.
A child who lives in a home where there is domestic
violence is likely to have one functioning parent and is only
subject to risk because of the actions of the second parent. The
Nebraska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “one or both
parents” language, therefore, can be particularly difficult for
children in a home where there is domestic violence.118
Likewise, the dependency barrier is particularly onerous for
children in a home where there is domestic violence because it
discounts orders of protection, the very proceeding by which
these children are likely to petition the court to fulfill the
dependency requirement.
The “one or both parents” prong has been narrowly
interpreted to restrict eligibility because courts appear hesitant
to recognize that a child in a stable home environment might
be eligible for SIJS; whereas, the dependency prong clearly
restricts those eligible to a certain type of state court
dependency. Courts will likely begin to accept the intended
interpretation of the “one or both parents” language because
New York and California, influential states when it comes to
matters of immigration, have adopted the intended expansive
interpretation.119 In addition, once the approved USCIS
regulations are put in place to clarify that the addition of the
“one or both parents” language was intended to “expand
eligibility,” more uniform state application should follow.120 Not
all advocates believe the “one or both parents” clarification is
enough to ensure consistent interpretation across state lines.121
In fact, some advocates support increased regulatory guidance
regarding the “one or both parents” language because, “without
118 In re Erick M., 820 N.W.2d 639 (Neb. 2012).
119 Marcelina M-G. v. Israel S., 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (App. Div. 2013); see also
Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (4th Dist. Cal. 2014); In re Miguel
C.N., 989 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 2014); In re Jorge A.V.G., 987 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App.
Div. 2014); Sanchez v. Bonilla, 982 N.Y.S.2d 373 (App. Div. 2014); Cecilia M.P.S. v.
Santos H., 983 N.Y.S. 2d 840 (App. Div. 2014); Diaz v. Munoz, 989 N.Y.S.2d 52 (App.
Div. 2014); P.E.A. v. A.G.G., 975 N.Y.S.2d 85, 85 (App. Div. 2013).
120 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. 54978, 54979
(proposed Sept. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205-45).
121 Johnson & Stewart, supra note 65.
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an explicit recognition of the validity of one-parent SIJS cases,
there is the risk that even more state court judges will close the
door to eligible children before their petitions can be considered
by USCIS.”122 While their concern is valid, the “one or both
parents” problem—one of incorrect state interpretation of fairly
clear federal legislation—is less concerning than the
dependency problem, which stems from poor federal legislation.
The proceeding by which a child enters the state court is
not necessarily indicative of his or her level of vulnerability,
and it is certainly not within the state juvenile court judge’s
jurisdiction to refuse relief based on concerns for immigration
fraud.123 A child like Jane may appear drastically different from
a foster care child or a child seeking SIJS as a result of an
approved guardianship petition with a non-biological parent,
but in many ways there are few legal distinctions. Consider
Jane and Susy: they have each been abused, neglected, or
abandoned by a biological parent and need to re-adjust their
legal rights with that parent.124 The limited SIJS relief
available to non-foster care children arbitrarily ignores that a
child who has secured a final order of protection against a
parent is dependent upon the court for her safety.125 Instead,
Susy was granted relief because she established dependency on
the court, while Jane’s dependency was not recognized.126 The
inconsistency is glaring and quite concerning from a child
welfare perspective. There needs to be an expansion of
122 Id.
123 For instance, Jane sorely needed the court’s protection, as indicated by the
multiple orders of protection granted on her behalf to keep her safe from her abusive
father, while Susy was in no immediate danger. Nonetheless, some state court judges
have refused to make findings of dependency on the grounds that a juvenile only seeks
the order for immigration purposes. Adelson, supra note 5, at 81. For example, in In re
Mohamed B., the family court judge denied SIJS findings because he had suspicions as
to how the child separated from his hosts while visiting the United States. In re
Mohamed B., 921 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 2011) (reversing the New York State Second
Appellate Department). The most drastic example is In re Jason K. where a student
was denied SIJS relief because he was still lawfully present on a student visa, and the
judge noted that SIJS is exclusively intended for “[a]n unaccompanied child [who] is
subject to deportation unless granted permission to stay in the United States.” In re
Jason K. 972 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Fam. Ct. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Similar suspicion resulted in a denial of special findings because a child
arranged his own transport to the United States and thereby exhibited too much
agency to be determined dependent. Nirmal S. v. Rajinder K., 956 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App.
Div. 2012). The unfortunate result of this suspicion is that some very vulnerable
children are denied relief.
124 See supra INTRODUCTION.
125 Allie Meiers, Civil Orders of Protection: A Tool to Keep Children Safe, 19 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 373, 377 (2005).
126 See supra INTRODUCTION.
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dependency to include children who are in homes where there
is domestic violence.
Further complicating any efforts for reform, there is a
lack of demographic data about the children who seek SIJS
relief. There is no comprehensive, detailed reporting of the
individual characteristics of those children seeking relief either
at the state or federal level.127 New York State Family Courts
do not collect records or information about the type of
proceedings in which children petition juvenile courts for
special findings orders.128 The lack of reliable data is
problematic for meaningful reform efforts; it allows state
judges to continually stereotype applicants and provides little
guidance for how regulations should change to better
accommodate the population seeking SIJS relief. The remainder
of the note focuses on solving the dependency problem, since less
attention and fewer reform efforts have focused on eliminating
the dependency inconsistency.
III. PROMULGATING A FEDERAL REGULATION
A. Proposal
The most principled solution to the dependency problem
must include a federal solution, since at its root this is a
federally created problem. Just as the approved, but still
pending, September 2011 regulations129 attempt to clarify that
the “one or both parent” legislation was intended to “expand
eligibility,” USCIS should promulgate a regulation, or at least
distribute a regulatory guidance memorandum as to the
meaning of dependency, to help ensure that state courts grant
special findings orders to children like Jane. Specifically,
USCIS should pass a regulation explicitly providing that a
permanent one year civil order of protection issued by a
juvenile court is dispositive evidence that a child is dependent
upon the juvenile court for his or her “care and custody.”130
127 Email from Rosemary Hartmann, Adjudications Officer for the USCIS
Office of Policy & Strategy, to author (Nov. 20, 2013) (on file with author); Email from
Michael McLoughlin, First Deputy Chief Clerk for N.Y.C. Family Court, to author (Oct.
18, 2013) (on file with author). The author made several unsuccessful attempts to
receive data from USCIS regarding the demographics of SIJS beneficiaries as well as
unsuccessful attempts to receive data from New York City Family Courts issuing
special findings.
128 Email from Michael McLoughlin, to author, supra note 127.
129 See Specialized Immigrant Juvenile Petitions, 76 Fed. Reg. at 54979.
130 There is support for this position in the very recent Second Appellate
Department decision finding that “under the proper circumstances, a child involved in
1108 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:3
A civil order of protection is a court action intended to
address domestic violence safety concerns.131 It is widely
recognized that “[c]ivil protection orders are one of the most
commonly sought legal remedies available to protect domestic
violence victims.”132 Some form of this relief is available in all
50 states and the District of Columbia.133 A permanent order of
protection134 cannot be granted without a hearing in which the
accused party appears and has “an opportunity to be heard and
present evidence.”135 The duration of a permanent civil order of
protection varies from state to state, but in the majority of
states, a final order of protection is effective for one to two
years.136 Eligibility to file for a civil order of protection is
limited to a victim who can show beyond “a preponderance of
the evidence”137 that she has been subject to certain types of
threats or abuse and she has at least one of the enumerated
intimate relationships to the perpetrator.138 The conduct that is
generally required to merit an order of protection for a child
includes “overt acts of physical harm, threats of imminent
harm, harassment, sexual acts with minors, lewd fondling and
touching of a minor,” as well as “emotional abuse.”139 Most
states include the parent-child relationship as one of those
eligible for a civil order of protection.140 In some states, an order
of protection petition can be commenced in a state juvenile
a family offense proceeding involving allegations of abuse or neglect may properly be
the subject of such a determination as an intended beneficiary of the SIJS provisions.”
Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 1, 2015).
131 Lisa Vollendorf Martin, What’s Love Got To Do With It: Securing Access to
Justice For Teens, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 457, 466 (2012). “Additionally, civil orders of
protection (CPO) may be called many different things depending on the jurisdiction.
Some states call their civil orders of protection a Permanent Protective Order (PPO), a
Permanent Restraining Order (PRO) or some may simply refer to the order as a
domestic violence injunction.” Meiers, supra note 125, at 375-76.
132 NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
TO LITIGATING FAMILY OFFENSE PROCEEDINGS 1, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/
images/FINAL-ThePractitioner%27sGu.pdf (last visited May 11, 2015).
133 Martin, supra note 131, at 466.
134 Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 101 (2005). The reader should
distinguish a final order of protection from an ex parte order which can be granted with
significantly fewer procedural protections for the accused and generally lasts for a
much shorter period of time. Id.
135 Meiers, supra note 125, at 379.
136 Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Symposium on Domestic Violence:
Article: Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and
Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 848, 905 (1993); Meiers, supra note 125, at 375-76.
137 Smith, supra note 134, at 101.
138 Klein & Orloff, supra note 136, at 848, 869.
139 Meiers, supra note 125, at 377.
140 Martin, supra note 131, at 469-71.
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court on a child’s behalf by a parent, the state or a welfare
agency, or the child herself.141
Frivolous allegations do not merit a permanent order of
protection.142 A permanent order of protection is already
considered “convincing” evidence of battery in other
immigration contexts.143 Expanding dependency to include
proceedings in which permanent orders of protection are
granted for at least one year ensures an avenue to SIJS relief
for children in homes where there is domestic violence.
B. Benefits of a Narrow Regulatory Amendment
Various proposals have been put forward to handle the
SIJS dependency problem. Some advocate that states should
amend their civil codes to “ensure a jurisdictional basis for
freestanding SIJS predicate order motions in juvenile or family
courts” or to provide a “self-petitioning ‘state of want’ cause of
action” enabling children to “initiate a SIJS predicate order
request outside of the context of a dependency action.”144 The
problem with a state-by-state campaign is that it does nothing
to promote uniform SIJS relief but rather contributes to
inconsistent application across state lines. Furthermore, such
an expansive broadening of state juvenile court jurisdiction to
grant special findings orders seems inconsistent with the
history of SIJS.
Others advocate for federal reform, including an
expanded definition of dependency. SIJS advocates Randi
Mandelbaum and Elissa Steglich propose clarifying or
broadening dependency by “either chang[ing] the statutory
language from ‘declared dependent’ to ‘the state court having
141 “State protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups with regard
to standing for minor petitioners: (1) statutes that expressly grant standing to some or
all minors; (2) statutes that expressly deny standing to some or all minors; and (3)
statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.” Id. (citations omitted).
142 Meiers, supra note 125, at 377.
143 Liebmann, supra note 36, at 653 (“‘Credible evidence of battery or extreme
cruelty’ can include the type of restraining orders and civil protection orders that are
frequently sought and issued in family offense and child dependence proceedings in
family court. In fact, such orders are generally considered among the most convincing
types of evidentiary proof that can be offered, and noncitizens who obtain protection
orders have established one of the most important elements of the VAWA self-petition.
Such orders can serve as critical support for the noncitizen’s claim of battery or
extreme cruelty and can confirm the credibility of the self-petitioner.”).
144 Baum, supra note 38, at 623. These authors argue that states should be
incentivized to makes changes because once a child becomes eligible for SIJS the child
is “federal[ly] eligibl[e] for health care, employment authorization, financial aid, and
other benefits denied to unlawfully present immigrants.” Id.
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assumed jurisdiction,’ or [ ] defin[ing] ‘declared dependent’ in
the federal regulations simply as ‘the state court having
assumed jurisdiction.’”145 Supporting this argument, they point
to practitioners’ and state court judges’ common understanding
that dependency simply means that a juvenile court has taken
jurisdiction over a matter related to the child.146 Mandelbaum
and Steglich are most concerned with inconsistent state
interpretations of dependency, rather than the exclusion of a
particular vulnerable child population.147 A broad expansion of
dependency like that put forth by Mandelbaum and Steglich
would likely encourage increased scrutiny by state court judges
who already arguably exceed their jurisdiction by questioning a
child’s motive for relief, rather than focusing on the domestic
petition the child brings before the court.148 Certainly,
Mandelbaum’s and Steglich’s broad proposal includes child
support orders as sufficient evidence of dependency.149 My
proposal does not go so far as to include children who appear
before a juvenile court under a child support enforcement order.150
Instead, the focus of this solution is on including a small,
vulnerable group of immigrant children, which is both consistent
with the purpose of SIJS to protect the most vulnerable children
and more politically feasible than broad reform.
Adding orders of protection to the definition of
dependency is consistent with the original purpose of SIJS—to
protect vulnerable children.
[N]ot all violence or abuse directed towards children evokes the
criminal or juvenile justice systems. When a parent or guardian
petitions the court for a civil order of protection for [a] child, it might
be the first contact the adult or child has had with the judicial system.
145 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 616.
146 Id.
147 Id. This note does not focus on the variation between states as to the
meaning of dependency or the type of proceedings that various states include within
that meaning. It does not appear that any states currently consider a civil order of
protection to fall within that definition.
148 For state courts to engage in that type of review usurps the decision-
making function of USCIS. State courts involve themselves in these issues that are
best left to immigration authorities, who do in fact conduct that analysis on a regular
basis. Johnson & Stewart, supra note 65.
149 Note that I do not advocate expanding SIJS relief to include a case like In
re Hei Ting C. where advocates tried to argue that a child support order should also be
sufficient to qualify a child for the dependency prong. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
150 See Fifo v. Fifo, No.O-9277-12, 2015 WL 1447564, *2 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr.
1, 2015), where the Second Appellate Department distinguished a proceeding involving
an order of protection from the issue in In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App.
Div. 2013), involving a child support order.
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Civil orders of protection statutes were designed to encompass the
minor children of domestic abuse victims.151
Furthermore, there is precedent for using regulatory
guidance to expand the scope of SIJS relief. When SIJS was a
relatively new form of relief and advocates of children in foster
care became aware of its potential benefit, there was a large
group of undocumented children in the foster care system on
the verge of emancipation.152 These children already had
dependency orders from a juvenile court as part of their foster
care placement.153 To handle the volume of SIJS applicants,
child welfare workers capitalized upon the statutory and
regulatory language that supported an administrative agency’s
ability to determine the “best interest” of immigrant children in
the SIJS context.154 Both the INA Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) and
the federal regulations associated with SIJS relief allowed for
“administrative or judicial proceedings” as the basis for
determining that it is not in the child’s “best interest” to return
to their home country or to reunite with one or both parents.155
A child advocate involved in early SIJS adjudication in
New York City explained the logic behind the hybrid procedure:
To avoid having to get back in court, we coupled the non-[SIJS] court
finding placing the child in care with an affidavit from a high level
child welfare official made the other factual findings based on a
review of the file and our submissions. INA 101(a)(27)(J) requires a
juvenile court for dependency, but contemplates “administrative or
judicial proceedings” for the rest. Our assertion, which back then
legacy INS accepted, was that the affidavit was the result of an
administrative process sufficient to satisfy the statute.156
The regulatory guidance paved the way for broader
interpretation of SIJS. In the same way, future regulation
could pave the way for increased recognition of the serious
vulnerability of immigrant children in homes where there is
domestic violence. This note’s proposed expansion, like the
amendment to include guardianship as a ground for dependency,
does nothing more than ensure that vulnerable youth who are
indistinguishable from current SIJS beneficiaries, apart from
151 Meiers, supra note 125, at 384.
152 Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, supra note 102; see Email
from David B. Thronson, to author, supra note 102.
153 Id.
154 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(ii) (2012); 8
C.F.R. § 204.11 (c)(6) (2014).
155 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(27)(J)(ii).
156 Telephone Interview with David B. Thronson, supra note 102; Email from
David B. Thronson, to author, supra note 102.
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the proceeding by which they approach the state juvenile court,
are afforded the same relief.157
C. Politically Feasible
In addition, regulatory rulemaking is also a practical,
politically feasible solution, which is crucially important in our
current political atmosphere. In fact, the TVPRA has recently
come under attack:
The Obama administration says the [TVPRA] is partly responsible
for tying its hands in dealing with the current influx of
children . . . . What many can agree on is that the Wilberforce law
was not enacted with the idea of dealing with the current flow of
tens of thousands of unaccompanied minors or providing an
incentive for children to reach the border. “It is classic unintended
consequences,” said Marc R. Rosenblum, deputy director of the U.S.
Immigration Policy Program at the Migration Policy Institute. “This
was certainly not what was envisioned.”158
The Obama administration’s comments are not
specifically directed toward the SIJS Amendments included in
the TVPRA, but nonetheless show a mounting concern that
immigration relief extended to vulnerable children is too
generous. “[G]iven the hostile climate toward immigration-
related legislation in Congress, regulatory action may be more
expedient and appropriate.”159 A regulatory change would not
need to pass through Congress, and to the extent that Congress
disagrees with the change, the Congressional Regulatory
Review Act provides them with the power to reject the rule
within 60 days of its enactment.160 Of course, any amendment
of the dependency prong might face especially stringent
criticism because Congressional and federal authorities
welcome the dependency requirement as a safeguard against
fraud, allegedly legitimizing SIJS proceedings.161 The Second
Appellate Department of New York’s Supreme Court, in
denying special findings based upon a lack of sufficient
dependency, specifically noted:
The requirement that a child be dependent upon the juvenile
court . . . ensures that the process is not employed inappropriately by
157 See infra Part II.
158 Hulse, supra note 42; see also Preston, supra note 3.
159 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 616 n.82.
160 Robert Longley, Federal Regulations, ABOUT NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/uscongress/a/fedregulations.htm.
161 In re Hei Ting C., 969 N.Y.S.2d 150, 154-55 (App. Div. 2013).
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children who have sufficient family support and stability to pursue
permanent residency in the United States through other, albeit more
protracted, procedures.162
Some juvenile court judges understand expanded SIJS
relief as a slippery slope toward immigration fraud and
scrutinize immigrant children seeking special findings orders:163
[T]he local officials are often wary of the implications of their actions
and nervous about what they perceive as making decisions about
whether a person will obtain an immigration benefit. Some may not
want to participate in what they perceive as a process that condones
or further encourages illegal immigration.164
A recent Queens Family Court decision granting SIJS relief
warned in dicta that:
Current news reports indicate that parents have been encouraged to
dispatch their young on perilous journeys to the United States in the
company of paid smugglers who are part of organized criminal
enterprises. The children arrive in the United States with the hope
that they will be not be deported and that they will be granted
sanctuary in the form of legal permission to remain permanently.
Although SIJS was enacted to protect children who have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned, it may perversely expose those
children to maltreatment. The smuggling of children across
international borders is inimical to their safety and well-being.165
There is little doubt that any proposed expansion of
dependency might encounter resistance.166 However, like the
162 Id.
163 Johnson & Yavar, supra note 15, at 76.
164 Id.
165 In re Amandeep S., No. G-1310/14, 2014 WL 2808690, *13 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
June 19, 2014).
166 In fact, on March 4, 2015, a local NBC investigative team reported the
uncovering of rampant SIJS fraud in the Sikh community in Queens, New York. Melissa
Russo et al., I-Team: Family Court Exploited in Immigration Cases in Queens, Insiders
Charge, NBCNEWYORK.COM (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:16 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/
local/family-court-queens-immigration-cases-human-smuggling-green-card-295050931.html.
Their report noted that guardianship petitions in the Queens Family Court jumped
75% over the last year and that “hundreds of young men from the same part of India
are all telling similar stories in order to get special access to green cards.” Id.
Congressman Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee picked up on the
report and sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Johnson
specifically requesting answers to the following questions:
1) What immediate steps will you take to ensure that fraudulent SIJ
petitions are not approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) adjudicators? 2) What long term changes will you make to the
adjudications process and policies to ensure that fraudulent SIJ petitions are
not approved by USCIS adjudicators? 3) How exactly will you coordinate with
state courts to ensure that abuse, abandonment or neglect is not found by
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2008 Amendments that codified guardianship proceedings as
per se establishing dependency, the addition of orders of
protection to a regulatory definition merely extends protection
to those eligible for SIJS by authorizing a new posture by
which children can approach the court. In addition, this
proposal arguably expands eligibility to a much smaller group
than the 2008 Amendments. At least one experienced state
court judge, Judge Pfau of New York, recognizes that
dependency must have a broader meaning than the narrow
limitations currently imposed on the definition.167
Furthermore, the statute is not reaching enough
vulnerable children, as evidenced by the small number of
children actually obtaining SIJS relief. The 5,000 cap allotted
to SIJS beneficiaries168 has yet to be met in any year since the
legislation’s enactment.169 There was considerable surprise and
perhaps disappointment when, “rather than a flood anticipated
by some SIJS detractors,” the groundbreaking 2008
Amendments actually resulted in only “a trickle” of the
expected increase.170 For many years, only 500 SIJS
beneficiaries adjusted to LPR status.171 The number of
beneficiaries slowly increased after the 2008 Amendments;
however, even in 2013, at its peak, 2,735 reserved positions
these courts when there is evidence of fraudulent claims? 4) What, if any,
statutory changes do you suggest to give you additional tools to ensure that
fraudulent SIJ petitions are not approved by USCIS adjudicators?
Letter from Congressman Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Judiciary Comm., to Jeh
Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Mar. 19, 2015), available at https://goodlatte.house.gov/
system/uploads/415/original/RWG_to_Johnson_3.19.15.pdf. These developments appear
to be the most recent and also direct attack on SIJS as a form of relief since 1997.
Various immigration advocacy agencies have come together drafting a letter in
response to Congressman Goodlatte explaining the value of SIJS and correcting some
exaggerations and misunderstandings of how SIJS operates. Email from Ctr. on
Immigration & Child Welfare, to author (Mar. 29, 2015) (on file with author).
167
Juveniles may be eligible to apply to federal immigration authorities for SIJS
where, in any category of court proceeding, a State court has determined that
they are abused, neglected or abandoned, that ‘family reunification is not an
option’ and that it would be contrary to their best interests to return to their
home country.
Memorandum from Hon. Ann Pfau, to Judges of the Family Court, supra note 92.
168 Beth Morales Singh, To Rescue, Not Return: An International Human
Rights Approach To Protecting Child Economic Migrants Seeking Refuge in the United
States, 41 COLUM. J. L & SOC. PROB. 511, 526 (2008).
169 See infra note 172.
170 Jackson, supra note 15, at 22.
171 Ooi, supra note 16, at 896.
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remained unfilled.172 In 2012, a total of 2,250 immigrant
children obtained LPR status as a result of SIJS,173 leaving
2,740 reserved positions empty. Even with increased eligibility,
on average only one quarter of the 5,000 reserved SIJS LPR
positions are filled.174
172 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE ANDDETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2013 tbl. 7
(2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-lawful-
permanent-residents (click “Table 7”) [hereinafter PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2013 TABLE].
173 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE ANDDETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2012 tbl. 7
available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2012-legal-permanent-
residents (click “Table 7”) [hereinafter PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT
RESIDENT STATUS 2012 TABLE].
174 Singh, supra note 165, at 526; Ooi, supra note 16, at 890, 896; Adelson,
supra note 5, at 85.
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TABLE 1: TOTAL SIJS BENEFICIARIES ADJUSTING STATUS 1997-
2013175
Fiscal year Total SIJS
Beneficiaries
2013 2,735
2012 2,250
2011 1,609
2010 1,480
175 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 36 (1997), available at https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1997YB.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1998
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 32 (1998),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1998/1998yb.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 32 (1999), available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2000
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 31 (2000),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2000/Yearbook2000.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 29 (2001), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/yearbook/2001/yearbook2001.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED
CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 5 (2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
fiscal-year-2002-yearbook-immigration-statistics-0 (click “Table 5”); U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE
AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2003-0 (click “Table 5”); U.S. DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY
TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 4 (2004), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2004-0 (click “Table 4”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2005 tbl. 7 (2005), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2005-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2006 tbl. 7 (2006), available
at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2006-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
2007 tbl. 7 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-
2007-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2008 tbl. 7 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
yearbook-immigration-statistics-2008-3; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS
OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED CLASS OF
ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2009 tbl. 7 (2009), available at https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-
immigration-statistics-2009-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS BY TYPE AND DETAILED
CLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCAL YEAR 2010 tbl. 7 (2010), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2010-3 (click “Table 7”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
BY TYPE ANDDETAILEDCLASS OF ADMISSION: FISCALYEAR 2011, tbl. 7 (2011), available at
https://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2011-legal-permanent-residents
(click “Table 7”); PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2012
TABLE, supra note 173; PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS 2013
TABLE, supra note 172.
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2009 1,144
2008 989
2007 772
2006 894
2005 660
2004 624
2003 445
2002 510
2001 541
2000 658
1999 345
1998 287
1997 430
A less-than-fifty percent fulfillment rate is curiously
paltry when compared to the success of other immigration
programs for vulnerable, undocumented immigrants; 2014
marked the fifth consecutive year where all 10,000 U-Visas176
were utilized within the first several months of the fiscal year.177
No single, independent explanation has been offered for
why SIJS continually remains an underutilized form of relief
given the increasingly large number of vulnerable
undocumented children in the United States.178 Advocates
suggest that a lack of awareness among child advocates and
immigrant children is likely the largest contributor to the
consistently low number of beneficiaries.179 Regardless of the
reason that SIJS relief has not reached its cap, Congress
clearly left room for more children to qualify for SIJS relief.
There is no principled logic to preclude children like Jane when
they are clearly in need of protection and there is a continual
deficit in SIJS beneficiaries.180
176 The U-Visa provides relief to victims of domestic violence and is further
discussed later in this piece. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
177 The U-Visa was created in 2008 and predictably fulfills its 10,000 quota
within the first several months of the fiscal year. Daniel M. Kowalski, USCIS Approves
10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM:
IMMIGRATION LAW (Dec. 12, 2010 8:24 AM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/
immigration/b/insidenews/archive/2013/12/12/uscis-approves-10-000-u-visas-for-5th-
straight-fiscal-year.aspx?utm_source=Migration+%26+Child+Welfare+National+
Network+E-News&utm_campaign=58b32dae2c-MCWNN_E_News_061013&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_4a8508bf17-58b32dae2c-90769025.
178 Jackson, supra note 15, at 22.
179 Mandelbaum & Steglich, supra note 9, at 612.
180 Since the recent surge of unaccompanied youth across the border in 2014,
there will arguably be a much higher number of SIJS petitioners and as a result a
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Others who object to expanding the definition of
dependency may argue that the addition of a final order of
protection is duplicative of other forms of comparable relief, in
particular the U-Visa that was designed for victims of domestic
violence and might afford protection to a child like Jane.181 The
U-Visa is a nonimmigrant visa182 available to undocumented
victims of certain enumerated crimes in the United States who
cooperate with law enforcement in the prosecution of crimes
committed against them, including crimes categorized as
domestic violence.183 An integral part of the U-Visa is the
receipt of a certification that the victim has cooperated with
law enforcement in the prosecution of the crime.184 A variety of
state-recognized officials have the authority to grant these
certificates, including police commissioners, family court
judges, head officials of state agencies, and other state
officials.185 U-Visa holders are eligible to adjust to LPR status
after three years of U-Visa status.186
The U-Visa does not offer relief that obviates the need
for additional federal regulatory guidance as to the meaning of
SIJS dependency. Children are currently eligible for U-Visa
status either as the primary beneficiaries or as derivatives of a
much higher number of SIJS beneficiaries. Hulse, supra note 42; Preston, supra note 3.
It remains to be seen whether SIJS will reach the 5,000 cap for 2014.
181 Liebmann, supra note 36, at 652. Liebmann notes that SIJS, VAWA, and U
visas are the most utilized forms of relief for immigrant survivors of family crisis. The
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) is not as applicable here because it requires that
the abusing parent be either a United States citizen or a permanent resident in order
for a child to seek relief under the statute. VAWA relief was enacted in 1994 and was
the first immigration remedy provided explicitly for victims of domestic violence. A
VAWA self-petitioner must satisfy seven requirements to establish eligibility: “(1)
relationship to the abuser; (2) that the abuser is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident; (3) that the petitioner resides in the United States (though there are
exceptions to this); (4) that the petitioner does, or at one time did, reside with the
abuser; (5) credible evidence of battery or extreme cruelty; (6) good moral character;
and (7) that the petitioner married the abuser in good faith, and not for the purpose of
evading immigration laws.” Id. at 653 (citation omitted). The most difficult criteria for
a victim to prove is the “credible evidence of battery” though orders of protection are
used and considered to be “convincing” evidence of battery. Id.
182 A nonimmigrant visa is one that is “issued to persons with a permanent
residence outside the U.S. but who wishes to be in the U.S. on a temporary basis” as
opposed to an immigrant visa which is issued to a person who plans to change his
residency to the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Immigrant Visas v.
Nonimmigrant Visas, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://help.cbp.gov/
app/answers/detail/a_id/72/~/immigrant-visas-vs.-nonimmigrant-visas (last visited May
1, 2015).
183 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U) (2012).
184 Id.
185 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION
RES GUIDE FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
2-3, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_u_visa_certification_guide.pdf.
186 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(U).
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parent’s petition, but the enumerated crimes do not include
child specific “civil-crimes” like neglect, abuse, or
abandonment.187 In addition, the U-Visa is a nonimmigrant
visa, and beneficiaries do not become eligible to petition for
LPR status until two years after they have held U-Visa
status.188 For SIJS beneficiaries, timely processing is important
because federal and state college financial aid often depend
upon one’s legal immigration status.189 Thus, the U-Visa is not
a viable solution for children like Jane who might have only
suffered civil rather than criminal harms and who rely on
expedient processing in order to lead stable lives.
In addition, a parent could petition for a U-Visa and
include his or her child as a derivative on the application, but
derivative status is not adequate immigration relief for a
vulnerable child. Jane’s mother may be ineligible for a U-Visa
for a variety of fairly common reasons, including “some aspect
of [a parent’s] background such as a criminal record or
immigration violation, or [ ] simply unsuccessful[ly] steering a
course through the minefield of immigration by, for example,
not using an attorney but rather trusting a ‘notario’ who files
botched papers.”190 Battered spouses are often deterred from
seeking help from the police because of the fear of deportation
or arrest.191 Seth Wessler conducted research about family
strife and found “[i]n numerous cases, police arrested victims of
domestic violence while investigating a report of abuse.”192 This
same deterrence might also prevent a parent from seeking an
order of protection on behalf of a child, but a parent’s failure to
seek an order of protection is not damning to a child’s ability to
seek a civil protection order. In many states, child protective
services may seek an order of protection on behalf of a child or
the child herself may petition the court for protection.193
187 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(V).
188 Liebmann, supra note 36, at 655.
189 Adelson, supra note 5, at 83.
190 David B. Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration
Law As Federal Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453,
480 (2008). These same reasons illustrate why VAWA derivative status described
supra note 176 also provides inadequate protection to children.
191 SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, SHATTERED FAMILIES;
THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILDWELFARE
SYSTEM 33 (2011), available at http://www.immigrationresearch-info.org/report/other/
shattered-families-perilous-intersection-immigration-enforcement-and-child-welfare-
syst (click link for “Report File”); Liebmann, supra note 36, at 655; WESSLER, supra, at 33.
192 Id.
193 “State protection-order statutes fall loosely into three groups with regard
to standing for minor petitioners: (1) statutes that expressly grant standing to some or
all minors; (2) statutes that expressly deny standing to some or all minors; and (3)
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It is extremely difficult to secure a U-Visa given the
high demand and potential hurdles.194 As a result, the U-Visa is
not a viable option for children like Jane, and regulatory action
remains the most feasible, practical solution to protect
undocumented children who live in homes where there is
domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
SIJS legislation has had a tumultuous history,
beginning as a remedy intended for foster care children and
currently utilized as a more comprehensive, child-specific
immigration remedy because of the lack of any comparable
child-specific immigration relief.195 Given the recent influx of
children across the southern border of the United States, the
need for child-specific immigration reforms has become a
politically, emotionally, and economically charged conversation
in the public sphere.196 Yet, the disturbing reality is that many
undocumented children are vulnerable, not as they cross the
border seeking a better life, but after arriving in the United
States where they live in the shadows.
If there were a principled reason to justify the distinctions
that SIJS legislation makes in determining eligibility for a state
special findings order, perhaps the conversation about the
problems with SIJS would be troubling but brief. However, there
is no reasonable explanation for the distinctions. Advocates who
continue to argue for legislative expansion of SIJS risk wasting
their efforts in the current political climate. The increased tension
at the southern border of the United States and the amplified
dialogue around illegal immigrants living in the United States
add to the already charged nature of the immigration debate.197
Rather, advocates should focus their efforts on data collection and
regulatory action, which will provide a faster and less politically
charged process.
Advocates must make efforts to increase data collection
of SIJS seekers in the state courts and those who file with
USCIS. Some have recognized this informational gap and
statutes that are ambiguous or silent on the issue.” Martin, supra note 131, at 469-71
(citations omitted).
194 The 10,000 U-Visa quota is routinely met within the first several months of
each fiscal year. Kowalski, supra note 177.
195 See supra Part I.
196 Hulse, supra note 42; see also Preston, supra note 3.
197 See supra Part III.B.
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begun efforts to collect comprehensive data about the
landscape of children seeking SIJS. The most notable effort has
been put forth by Jacqueline Bhabha and Susan Schmidt who
collected SIJS data organized by state in an attempt to
determine where SIJS education efforts should be focused.198
More projects of this kind, or state efforts to collect and
compute data related to children who petition juvenile courts
for special findings orders, are needed to better understand the
population of children seeking SIJS relief.
Regulatory action avoids the politics of the legislative
process and remains consistent with the traditional
understanding that SIJS was meant for the most vulnerable
children. Immigration fraud would not likely increase by
extending dependency to include a child who successfully
obtained a permanent civil order of protection. In fact, it is
consistent with the purpose of SIJS to protect the most
vulnerable children. There is a striking difference in
vulnerability between a child who never knew a parent and a
child who was actively abused by a parent. Susy never knew
her father, and the court found that sufficient to determine
that he abandoned her.199 In contrast, Jane witnessed and
experienced abuse at the hands of her father but only qualified
for the special findings order on appeal.200 The proposed
regulation further aligns the reach of SIJS with its purpose so
that SIJS will protect rather than exclude vulnerable children
who are just as deserving, if not more, than those currently
benefiting from SIJS relief.
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